Month: December 2021

In this post I will continue the discussion about the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. I will just pick up from where I left off in the first post.

XL continued.

This section continues with a discussion about the battle that the Visigoths had engaged in: “(209) Here King Theodorid, while riding by to encourage his army, was thrown from his horse and trampled under foot by his own men, thus ending his days at a ripe old age. But others say he was slain by the spear of Andag of the host of the Ostrogoths, who were then under the sway of Attila. This was what the soothsayers had told to Attila in prophecy, though he understood it of Aëtius. (210) Then the Visigoths, separating from the Alani, fell upon the horde of the Huns and nearly slew Attila. But he prudently took flight and straightway shut himself and his companions within the barriers of the camp, which he had fortified with wagons. A frail defence indeed; yet there they sought refuge for their lives, whom but a little while before no walls of earth could withstand.

From this section MacDowall infers that the Alani were defeated and routed and the Visigoths were then on the edge of breaking. Syvanne states that the Ostragoths managed to defeat the Visigoths after having engaged in a battle for many hours. At the very least both authors have embellished the account and inferred information that is just not there.

What we can say is that the battle of the Catalaunian Plains seems very confused with close fighting between the Ostragoths and Visigoths. We can also say that Attila was in the area. The cause of the death of Theodrid does not seem certain, but it does seem likely that the Ostragoths were within spear range of him and his lines.

The statement that the Visigoths separated from the Alani does not imply to me that the Alani retreated. Rather it says “the Visigoths, separating from the Alani, fell upon the horde of The Huns”. This suggests that the Visigoths were doing the movement causing the separation when the they fell upon the Hun. Falling on the Hun, in turn, suggests that they were advancing. This interpretation implies that the Alani were not retreating and the Visigoths were not defeated. Rather the Alani remained in position and the Visigoths advanced.

The other factor to consider is that Aetius had put the Alani between the Visigoths and Romans in order to reduce the possibility of them routing or deserting. Given all of these factors, I just find no evidence to support the contention that the Alani had routed. If such a significant event had occurred, it seems likely that Jordanes would have mentioned it.

The other item worth noting in these sections is that Attila had a camp fortified with wagons, but it was referred to as a frail defense. I take from these statements that the camp fortifications had been assembled quickly and that it was not a prepared defensive position. This information is consistent with a retreating army suddenly finding itself under threat and assembling makeshift fortifications.

Sections 211 and 212 discusses how both Thorismund and Aetius independently both became mixed up with the enemy in the darkness and confusion as night set in. These statements again point to the confusion of the battle.

Section 212 and 213 discuss the events of the next morning after the battle of the Catalaunian Plains was essentially over.

XLI

Section 217 is the most interesting part of this Chapter and relates to the number of troops involved: “In this most famous war of the bravest tribes, one hundred and sixty five thousand are said to have been slain on both sides, leaving out of account fifteen thousand of the Gepidae and Franks, who met each other the night before the general engagement and fell by wounds mutually received, the Franks fighting for the Romans and the Gepidae for the Huns”.

It suggests that 165,000 men were slain. I have interpreted this number as being a combined number from the Roman and Hun sides. In a previous section of Jordanes (182) he suggests that Attila had an army of 500,000, (not necessarily all on this campaign).

There is considerable discrepancy in books that people have published on the size of Attilas army at the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains.  MacDowall suggests that Attila had 5-10,000 Ostragoths, 10-15,000 Hun and 5-10,000 Gepids.  As far as I can tell, he bases these numbers on the statement that Attila could not forage enough to support an army any bigger. On the other hand Syvanne estimates 100,000 Hun, 40,000 Ostragoth infantry and 60,000 Ostragoth Cavalry and 50,000 Gepids.  Plus troops of various nations.  

Given that major battles of this type could have 30-35% casualties, I could see the estimates of Syvanne being a lot closer with troops from both sides combined being in the range of 500,000.

The other factor that supports the higher numbers is that Jordanes states that there were 15,000 casualties the night before in the battle between the Gepids and the Franks. While it is easy to get numbers wrong when you approach several hundred thousand, it is more difficult to get numbers wrong at the 15,000 level.    This 15,000 dead would have made a significant dent in the armies of both sides if the numbers presented by McDowall were correct.  Such a devastating combat would have been discussed in more detail.

The Hun supply situation.

I would like to thank Michael Blodgett for some of his insights in helping me develop some of my thoughts on the Hun supply situation. MacDowall suggests that there were only 10-15,000 Hun warriors at the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. He suggests that it could not have been any more as The Huns could not forage enough to support an army any bigger. I would like to challenge this assertion.

Attila had a good supply situation.  He probably had food and supplies provided by the Bishop of Troyes.  Also as Jordanes states (192), ”That portion of the earth accordingly became the threshing-floor for countless races”; in June the whole area would be flush with food – it was a bread basket for the whole region. Also, less than 100 miles behind Troyes were the friendly Franks around the Neckar river which would have provided supplies.
Attila on his march to Orleans probably set up intermediate depots, maybe at Sens and Montargis. Even though he did not get supplies when he arrived at Orleans, he probably had an excellent supply train that was fully capable of supporting a sizable army. In addition, the land at this time of year was probably plentiful and he had a supply line through friendly territory.

Even though the Hun are routinely portrayed as Nomadic people living solely off the land, by 450 AD hey had a Kingdom with a center of power in Pannonia. They were quite capable of creating supply lines and securing supplies from friendly peoples through which their supply lines passed. I do not see that the army size is limited by foraging ability alone.

Also, I just do not believe that Attila would engage in a campaign to eliminate the threat of the Visigoths by marching to their homeland with only 10-15,000 Hun troops.

An alternative theory for the battle.

Attila was retreating from Orleans in the direction of Metz. He wanted to retreat as quickly as possible so as not to be trapped by the combined Roman and Visigoth army. The terrain in this region consists of a number of parallel ridges running north to south. These ridges had gentler slopes on the West side and steeper slopes on the East side.

On the route from Orleans to Metz there are two sizable rivers the Seine and the Marne. For the crossing of the Seine, Troyes is the most logical option as it is the only major route in the direction of Metz; also Attila was familiar with Troyes. For the crossing of the Marne, there are several options, including Chalons.

Approaching Troyes is possible from the direction of Orleans on one of two roads passing through the gaps in a ridge West of Troyes. One road goes West from Troyes through Fontvannes and the other goes South West from Troyes, through Auxon. It is possible that Attila used both roads.

Crossing a river, even at a crossing would present a bottleneck due to the convergence of troops. This would cause the gap between any pursuing army and Attila to close. I therefore regard it as likely that any pursuing army caught up near either the Seine or the Marne. For now I will assume it was the Seine, but the argument that I am going to make could equally apply to the Marne.

Between the Seine at Troyes and the nearest ridge is about 8-10km. If the main bulk of Attila’s forces were bunched up at Troyes, preparing to cross the Seine, he would have an excellent view of the ridge in the distance. He would be able to see his rear-guard or a Roman/Visigoth advanced guard, or both, crossing the ridge. The initial Frank/Gepid clash referenced by Jordanes could easily have been an advanced guard / rear guard action at the ridge.

The sight of this threat to his troops on the plain would then be obvious to Attila, as he would have his back to the river with a larger army advancing. As the ridge is a defendable location, it would then be prudent to send troops to reinforce/capture the ridge to prevent a threat to his forces on the plain.

I could then see the battle being a large meeting engagement at the ridge. The Romans would be coming along the road from the West and the Visigoths from the road to the South West. The Alani could have been coming along either road or across country. I could then see the fight developing as more and more troops arrived from both sides.

The map below is a current map showing the topography of the region. I have indicated the ridge to the West of Troyes and the two road providing the axes of advance. The plain between the ridge and the Seine at Troyes is clear to see. The Riviere-de-Corps that was discussed in the first part of this blog discussion is also visible between the Romans and the Huns.

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In my next post I will discuss how I can see the battle of the Catalaunian Plains with these dispositions developing in line with Jordanes. My main goal is to take Jordanes and see if a battle consistent with the statements made by him makes sense. It is my contention that it does.

My next big project is going to be the 451 AD Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. This battle was between the Romans and The Huns. I have been reading about this battle and this post discusses the information that I have read and some of the contradictions that I have found. The post is getting quite long so I will split it into two, with the second part coming in a few weeks time.

The books that I bought are the “Military History of Late Rome 425-457” by Ilkka Syvanne as well as “Catalaunian Fields AD 451” and “Conquerors of the Roman Empire – The Goths”, both by Simon MacDowall. I also obtained a coy of the public domain writings by Jordanes, “Origins and deeds of the Goths”, translated by Charles C.Mierow. Both of Syvanne and MacDowall quote this Jordanes text as one of their primary sources of information as it represents one of the only complete texts about the battle.

Although in parts of this blog I may be critical of some of the assumptions and conclusions of both Syvanne and MacDowall, I should say that they have both provided an excellent starting point in understanding the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. They were particularly useful as there is very little information out there about this major battle. I fully recommend all three books for anyone looking at gaming this battle.

My main criticism of both authors is that they clearly state that the most complete account of the battle is Jordanes (a 6th century Roman bureaucrat) and that they have used his account as a primary source. However, they use parts of the text to support their view of the battle, while ignoring or misinterpreting parts of the text that do not support their view. To me this approach is not entirely consistent.

I should say that both authors come up with a different interpretation of the battle of the Catalaunian Plains based on the same starting information. Both accounts seem plausible when taken in isolation and as a war-gamer, both would make an excellent game. So to start with I have two potential battles to fight. However, I just wasn’t feeling comfortable with either account.

In order to review the battle, I too will go back to the Jordanes text and then discuss some of the assumptions of both authors along with my views. Due to the age, the Jordanes text is in the public domain so I can quote it directly. As I want to respect the other two authors copy-write, I will not be quoting their texts directly. You will need to purchase the books which are very reasonably priced.

The Jordanes text is divided into chapters numbered by Roman numerals, and then sections with standard numbers. I will go through the text in sequence giving these numbers. Some sections have not been included as they add no useful information for this discussion. One item to note is that I have used the translation of the original text done by Mierow; I am aware that there could be errors, but I have a very poor knowledge of Latin and I cannot contribute anything in relation to the translation.

Chapter XXXVI

Section 191 lists the allies of the Romans. “Now these were his auxiliaries: Franks, Sarmations, Armoricians, Liticians, Burgundians, Saxons, Riparians, Olibriones (once Roman soldiers and now the flower of the allied forces), and some other Celtic or German tribes. I will get back to this when I discuss the number of troops involved.

Section 192 discusses the location of the battle “And so they met in the Catalaunian Plains, which are also called Mauriacian, extending in length one hundred leuva, as the Gauls express it, and seventy in width. Now a Gallic leuva measures a distance of fifteen hundred paces. That portion of the earth accordingly became the threshing-floor of countless races. The two hosts bravely joined battle. Nothing was done under cover, but they contended in open fight”. 

Given that a Roman pace is 1.48m, the size of the Catalaunian Plains can be calculated to be 222 km x 155km (138 miles x 96 miles). This section really doesn’t tie down the location of the battle in any detail.

Chapter XXXVII

In Sections 194 and 195 the Alans are discussed. The Alans occupied Orleans, then known as Aureliani. “But before we set forth the order of the battle itself, it seems needful to relate what had already happened in the course of the campaign, for it was not only a famous struggle but one that was complicated and confused. Well then, Sangiban, king of the Alani, smitten with fear of what might come to pass, had promised to surrender to Attila, and to give into his keeping Aureliani, a city of Gaul wherein he dwelt. (195) When Theodorid and Aëtius learned of this, they cast up great earthworks around that city before Attila’s arrival and kept watch over the suspected Sangiban, placing him with his tribe in the midst of their auxiliaries. Then Attila, king of the Huns, was taken aback by this event and lost confidence in his own troops, so that he feared to begin the conflict. While he was meditating on flight–a greater calamity than death itself–he decided to inquire into the future through soothsayers”.

These sections show that the Alans were on the side of the Romans, but were not the most trusted allies. Once Attila had seen Theodorid and Aetius at Orleans, he began is retreat to the Catalaunian Plains.

XXVIII

 Section 197 is critical. It discusses the layout of the battlefield an the disposition of the Roman army. “The armies met, as we have said, in the Catalaunian Plains. The battle field was a plain rising by a sharp slope to a ridge, which both armies sought to gain; for advantage of position is a great help. The Huns with their forces seized the right side, the Romans, the Visigoths and their allies the left, and then began a struggle for the yet untaken crest. Now Theodorid with the Visigoths held the right wing and Aëtius with the Romans the left. They placed in the centre Sangiban (who, as said before, was in command of the Alani), thus contriving with military caution to surround by a host of faithful troops the man in whose loyalty they had little confidence. For one who has difficulties placed in the way of his flight readily submits to the necessity of fighting”. 

This passage is where I have problems with both authors. The text clearly says that the battlefield was a plain rising by a sharp slope to a ridge and that both sides wanted to control the ridge. Both authors make the case that the ridge is Montgueux Ridge a few miles West of Troyes. There is evidence that the battle occurred in this general area as another source, the Chronicle of Prosper claims that the battle takes place 5 miles from Troyes.

Syvanne makes the case that “subsequent details prove that the hill was located on the Roman left wing” without citing any such proof. MacDowall claims that this hill was on the Roman right wing, again without citing any proof. Jordanes if read without interpretation states that the battlefield was a plain rising by a sharp slope to a ridge. It does not say that part of the battlefield (Roman left or right) was a plain rising to a ridge. I will come back to this critical point when I discuss the brook details in section 208.

The section also states that the Romans and Visigoth seized the left. Having just discussed the ridge, I read this as the Romans and the Visigoths seized the left slope of the ridge. It then goes on to say that the Visigoths were on the right wing and the Romans were on the left wing, with the Alani in the middle. If both the Visigoths and the Romans seized the left slope and if they were on opposite flanks of the army, then the slope must have run the whole length of the army.

Section 198 discusses The Huns initial positions for the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. “On the other side, however, the battle line of the Huns was arranged so that Attila and his bravest followers were stationed in the centre. In arranging them thus the king had chiefly his own safety in view, since by his position in the very midst of his race he would be kept out of the way of threatening danger. The innumerable peoples of the divers tribes, which he had subjected to his sway, formed the wings”.

The section also states that The Huns with their forces seized the right side of the slope. This analysis suggests that the starting positions were two armies on the opposite side of a ridge which ran the entire length of the battlefield. On at least one side of this hill were plains. I just do not see how the text of Jordanes supports the ridge being at one end or other of the battlefield.

Section 199 to 200 discusses the Ostragoths and the Gepids. the key point from these sections is that the Ostragoths faced off against the Visigoths. this would place them on the left flank of The Huns. In this section it does not specifically say that the Gepids and other nations were on the Hun right, but with The Huns in the center, I would regard this placement as reasonable.

Section 201 is interesting and has potentially led to some false conclusions by Syvanne due to the initial assumptions about the ridge being only on one flank. “Attila alone was king of all kings over all and concerned for all. So then the struggle began for the advantage of position we have mentioned. Attila sent his men to take the summit of the mountain, but was outstripped by Thorismund and Aëtius, who in their effort to gain the top of the hill reached higher ground and through this advantage of position easily routed the Huns as they came up”.

From this section Syvanne has assumed that because the ridge was only on one flank that both Thorismund and Aetius must have been together on that flank. If instead the ridge runs the length of the battlefield, then both Thorismund and Aetius could have taken control of the entire length of the ridge with one on each flank. There is no evidence that Thorismund was with Aetius. Syvanne suggests that he is with Aetius as some sort of hostage to keep the Visigoths loyal. This statement just does not hold with section 197 which states that Aetius had surrounded the Alani with a host of faithful troops (one of which were the Visigoths on the right of the Alani). The Visigoths cannot be both faithful troops and potentially disloyal.

As a side note it is possible the both Aetius and Thorismund used cavalry to gain initial control of the ridge. I have no evidence to support this possibility but it is interesting to consider, particularly when trying to recreate the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains.

XXXIX

Sections 202 to 206 discuss Atilas words to his troops after being repulsed from the initial assault of the ridge. I won’t go into these sections in detail but there is an interesting point from a gaming perspective. Attila says “Who, moreover, made armed men yield to you, when you were as yet unarmed?” This section implies that the Hun, at least in part, were now using armor.

Also Attila says about the enemy in Section 204: “Let us then attack the foe eagerly; for they are ever the bolder who make the attack. Despise this union of discordant races! To defend oneself by alliance is proof of cowardice. See, even before our attack they are smitten with terror.  They seek the heights, they seize the hills and, repenting too late, clamor for protection against battle in the open fields. You know how slight a matter the Roman attack is. While they are still gathering in order and forming in one line with locked shields, they are checked, I will not say by the first wound, but even by the dust of battle”.

This clearly shows that the enemy are on the hills and not on the Plains as postulated by MacDowall. It also indicates that they formed in one line with locked shields.

XL (sections 207 and 208)

This chapter is where I have one of my major differences of opinion with MacDowall. In sections 207 and 208 it says: “And although the situation was itself fearful, yet the presence of their king dispelled anxiety and hesitation. Hand to hand they clashed in battle, and the fight grew fierce, confused, monstrous, unrelenting–a fight whose like no ancient time has ever recorded. There such deeds were done that a brave man who missed this marvellous spectacle could not hope to see anything so wonderful all his life long. For, if we may believe our elders, a brook flowing between low banks through the plain was greatly increased by blood from the wounds of the slain. It was not flooded by showers, as brooks usually rise, but was swollen by a strange stream and turned into a torrent by the increase of blood. Those whose wounds drove them to slake their parching thirst drank water mingled with gore. In their wretched plight they were forced to drink what they thought was the blood they had poured from their own wounds”.

MacDowall makes the case that a brook West of Troyes is called “la Riviere de Corps (the river of bodies)” and that this brook could be the brook referred to in section 208. I think that this argument has considerable merit and place names can often be a reflection of history. MacDowall uses this name to justify his belief that the battle of the Catalaunian Plains took place just West of Troyes. My main problem is that la Riveiere de Corps is actually south of the Ridge of Montegueux whereas MacDowall would lead us to believe that the battle took place north of the ridge. This seems another case of MacDowall selectively using information from Jordanes to justify his view of the battle, while ignoring information that is contradictory.

Summary

In order to avoid this blog post becoming too long, I plan to cover the rest of the Chapters in Jordanes in the next post as well as discussing how I plan to recreate the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. Some of the key items that I plan to discuss are 1) Did the Alans actually retreat as the authors suggest (spoiler alert – there is no evidence that they did) and 2) How many troops took part at the Catalaunian Plains as Syvanne and MacDowall have wildly differing views.